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While the UNHCR promotes voluntary repatriation as the preferred solution to refugee situations,there is little understanding of variation in refugees’ preferences regarding return. We develop atheoretical framework suggesting two mechanisms influencing refugees’ preferences. First,
refugees’ lived experiences in their country of origin prior to displacement and in their new host country
create a trade-off in feelings of being anchored to their origin or host country. Second, firsthand exposure
to traumas of war provides some refugees with a sense of competency and self-efficacy, leading them to
prefer to return home.We test these relationships with data from a survey among Syrian refugees hosted in
Lebanon. We find refugees exposed to violence during the war have a sense of attachment to Syria and are
most likely to prefer return. Refugees who have developed a detachment from Syria or an attachment to
Lebanon are less likely to prefer return.
INTRODUCTION
T he international community promotes threedurable solutions to refugee situations: integra-tion of refugees into host countries, resettlement
to third countries, and voluntary repatriation to countries
of origin. While all three may be viable under certain
circumstances, voluntary repatriation has long been pro-
moted by the office of the High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR) as the preferred solution (Barnett and
Finnemore 2004; Hammerstad 2000). Accordingly, vol-
untary repatriation programs have been attempted in
the wake of post-ColdWar conflicts in Rwanda, Bosnia,
Croatia, and Sudan. However, there are negative con-
sequences to promoting repatriation including increas-
ing levels of violations of non-refoulement1 and growing
numbers of refugees returning home before conditions
are safe for them to do so (McKernan 2019; Schwartz
2019).
Those debating repatriation focus on the obligations
and actions of host states and seemingly assume refugees
hold uniform or unimportant opinions regarding if, and
when, to return to their countries of origin. We contend
the preferences and abilities of refugees should not be
overlooked. We focus attention on understanding con-
ditions under which refugees would prefer to return to
their countries of origin. In comparison to the volumin-
ous literature on the causes of forced displacement, little
research explores the conditions under which refugees
repatriate. To contribute evidence on refugee prefer-
ences for return, we develop a theoretical framework,
adapting literature from psychology, in which we argue
refugees vary in terms of how anchored they feel to
either their country of origin or their current host coun-
try. We claim this variation depends, in part, upon the
nature of their lived experiences, both in their country of
origin prior to displacement and subsequently in the host
country.
We begin by exploring two features of refugees’
predisplacement exposure to violence. First, we note
that individuals more deeply anchored to their origin
locations were more likely to stay at those locations for
a longer duration before being displaced and, thus,
were more likely to be exposed to violence. Second,
their exposure to violence imbued them with an appre-
ciation of their tolerance to unstable conditions.
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1 For example, several developed states, including Australia, Italy,
and the US, have been criticized for refusing to rescue forced
migrants at peril at their borders and for deporting asylum seekers
























































































































Through this exposure, individuals develop “expertise”
in assessing risks associated with violence. That is, they
develop efficacy in surviving insecurity. By contrast,
refugees not directly exposed to violence before fleeing
are unsure of the level of threat associated with return-
ing and unwilling to accept the risk of doing so. Both the
underlying anchoring and the newly developed under-
standing of risk make refugees who stayed at home
longer and were exposed to violence more likely to
desire a return to their countries of origin.
What anchors refugees to locations does not end
when they flee their homes.We contend an individual’s
desire as to whether or not to return home will also be
affected by the extent to which they have developed
ties and dependencies in their new host state. Individ-
uals who have developed social anchors in the host
state should, naturally, be less likely to desire a return
to their country of origin.
We test these theoretical arguments using an original
survey, carried out in Summer 2018 among nearly 2,000
Syrian refugees hosted in Lebanon. We use the survey
to identify the influence of conflict exposure and
anchoring (or attachment) to both Syria and Lebanon
on refugees’ preferences for the future. We employ
both observational and experimental elements from
the survey for this purpose. We find those who have
been exposed to violence prior to their departure and
left when most of their hometown had fled are most
likely to prefer returning to Syria. Refugees who dis-
cussed the matter of fleeing as well as those who find it
easy to cross the Lebanese/Syrian border are more
likely to prefer remaining in Lebanon.
This paper contributes to scholarship on refugee
movement in two important ways. First, most research
on refugee repatriation takes the perspective of nation-
states, exploring their obligations to and violations of
international refugee law. We examine the agency and
preferences of refugees themselves. Second, we
develop a novel theory of refugee repatriation that
accounts for both individuals’ past exposure to violence
and their sense of attachment to both their country of
origin and their current host country.
REPATRIATION AS THE PREFERRED
SOLUTION
As the number of refugees globally has increased, the
traditional solutions promoted by the UNHCR have
become collectively insufficient in alleviating refugee
hardship. In 2016, “only 2.5% of refugees (552,000)
were able to return to their home countries… and even
fewer, 0.8% (or 189,300), were resettled through for-
mal settlement programs. An even smaller percent age
(0.001%, or 23,000) were naturalized as citizens” in
host countries (Ferris 2018).
While collectively insufficient, these numbers sug-
gest repatriation—or return to the country of origin—is
the most frequently observed “solution.” These rates
speak to a flaw in the durable solutions model: public
prioritization of repatriation gives current and potential
host states an excuse to discount and, thus, shirk their
contributions to integration and resettlement alterna-
tives. Since repatriation is considered the preferred
solution, local integration has morphed into underre-
sourced, temporary hosting, while resettlement quota
numbers have receded dramatically (Salehyan 2018).
More than eight of every ten refugees are hosted by
states neighboring their countries of origin. These are
typically developing countries requiring more assist-
ance than is available to meet the demands associated
with hosting refugees (Bradley 2013). There are several
domestic challenges associated with refugee hosting
and integration. Refugees are often challenged by
inadequate language skills and culture shocks (Akar
and Erdoğdu 2019). At the same time, citizen popula-
tions in host countries often struggle to accept refugee
populations, especially given the large numbers in pro-
tracted scenarios (Ghosn, Braithwaite, and Chu 2019).
Given that developing host states are stretched thin
and developed states lack political will to open their
doors, it makes sense that repatriation is identified as
the preferred solution for refugee crises (Barnett and
Finnemore 2004; Hammerstad 2000). International law
dictates four preconditions for the initiation of large
scale repatriation programs: (1) there is a fundamental
change of circumstances in the country of origin that
would reduce the risk associated with return; (2) the
decision to return is voluntary in nature; (3) a tripartite
agreement is signed between the origin state, host
country, and the UNHCR; and (4) the return process
happens in safety and dignity. In practice, all conditions
are rarely met, especially when host governments pres-
sure both the UNHCR and refugees themselves to
return. The lack of accountability toward upholding
these conditions leads to commentary questioning
whether observed returns of refugees are truly volun-
tary (Black and Gent 2006).
Repatriation as a solution is not without its detract-
ors. Critics argue such a strong focus upon repatriation
encourages overburdened host states to violate norms
of non-refoulement (Barnett 2001). Repatriation is con-
sidered to be a way for host states to release themselves
from their duty of hosting refugees, thus eroding the
human right to asylum (Adelman and Barkan 2011). In
response to the growing economic and social burden
they face, governments often frame hosting as a tem-
porary solution, with many of them pushing for refu-
gees to leave as soon as possible (Orchard 2014). This
trend has resulted in growing numbers of refugees
returning to states lacking the capacity to absorb them.
This includes hundreds of thousands of Syrians who
have been encouraged to voluntarily sign repatriation
paperwork and depart Turkey even while the civil war
at home rages on (McKernan 2019). Similarly, more
than 80,000 Somali refugees have returned home from
Kenya since a repatriation program was agreed
between UNHCR, Kenya, and Somalia in 2013, with
almost 3,000 of these individuals having again since
been displaced from Somalia (Loughran and Aden
2019).
While repatriation as a program is clearly problem-
atic, refugees in many situations do appear to hold
strong preferences to return home, even while violence
























































































































continues in their country of origin (Chu 2019; Stein
andCuny 1994). Howmight we explain this incongruity
between public commentary and refugee preferences?
Academic scholarship often views decisions regarding
return through the same “push and pull” framework
used to explain their initial displacement (Davenport,
Moore, and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2007;
Schmeidl 1997). Return is deemed most likely when
circumstances at home are better than conditions in
exile (Koser 1997).
Under this framework, refugees returning during
conflict may at first blush appear somewhat puzzling.
However, refugee return under continued duress in the
country of origin may not be so surprising given the
dwindling opportunities for resettlement in third coun-
tries and the worsening conditions on the ground in
temporary host countries. For example, Syrian refu-
gees who have returned while their civil war is ongoing
have commonly cited limited opportunities in the host
state and a shift in aid resources to areas in Syria as
reasons for their return (Al-Khateeb and Toumeh
2017). In addition, evidence suggests host state restric-
tions on movement, economic opportunities, and
access to welfare provisions such as medical care to
refugees, also make it difficult to sustain livelihoods
abroad, in turn increasing the likelihood of return
(Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015). In some instances,
ultimatums by host states may motivate return migra-
tion. For example, Sudanese refugees in Israel must
choose between repatriation with a stipend or the
threat of detention (Gerver 2014).
Existing scholarship on refugee return has not fully
addressed several issues. Many studies homogenize
refugees’ experiences and the effect these have on their
preferences.2 Such studies assume refugees are dis-
placed by violence and thus deterred from returning
to their home countries until the conflict has ended.
However, there is variation in refugees’ exposure to
violence, the factors motivating their decisions to flee,
and the preferences they hold regarding returning
home. Accordingly, many struggle to explain why a
majority of surveyed Syrian refugees want to return
home (Alsharabati and Nammour 2017; Berlin Social
Science Center 2015). Even these survey-based studies
neglect to address questions regarding the timing of
potential repatriation. Thus, as refugees are observed
returning while violence continues in their country of
origin, a more comprehensive understanding of why
this is happening is required.
UNDERSTANDING REFUGEES’ MOVEMENT
PREFERENCES
Little research explores conditions under which refu-
gees are likely to repatriate, and even less examines
how refugees’ preferences affect this process or how
these compare with preferences to remain in the host
state. In this section, we derive a set of testable hypoth-
eses from a logic based upon notions of exposure to
violence and attachment to place.
Adapting Kuhlman’s (1990) framework of refugee
integration in host countries, we suggest refugee deci-
sion making is affected by four categories of factors, as
summarized in Table 1. While we acknowledge the
factors across these different categories are inter-
related, for the sake of simplicity we consider each
category separately.
Several demographic characteristics of the refugee’s
preflight life likely affected their initial decision to flee
and could influence whether they later wish to return
home. Women and children are often early movers in
displacement and, as a consequence, are a high propor-
tion of the global refugee population—76% of Syrian
refugees are women and/or children.3 Wealthier indi-
viduals have more resources to flee early (Schon 2019)
and can afford to stay longer in exile in a host country.
Individuals maintaining gainful employment in their
hometowns may be more reluctant to flee than
unemployed individuals who might be expected to
depart sooner to seek out opportunities elsewhere
(Adhikari 2012). Finally, individuals with social ties to
kin abroad may be more likely to travel to join them
once conflict breaks out. These logics also suggest
women and children, wealthy individuals, those with-
out job prospects at home, and those with stronger ties
to displaced individuals are less likely to want to
return home.
Flight factors refer to changing conditions and con-
texts influencing an individual’s decision to flee or stay
in their country of origin. Such decisions are driven in
the aggregate by root causes of flight. The outbreak of
war destroys infrastructure and inhibits economic
opportunities, making an individual feel as if they have
no choice but to leave (Adhikari 2012; Moore and
Shellman 2006; Steele 2009). Individual decisions are
also affected by interpersonal relationships and
whether or not members of their familial and social
networks have chosen to flee or stay. Decisions regard-
ing whether to return likely involve a reassessment of
these flight factors and perceptions of safety or harm
associated with returning to origin locations.
We also believe host-related factors or aspects of the
refugee’s situation in the host country influence deci-
sions about future journeys. Such conditions likely
include the availability of economic opportunities such
as housing, employment, and access to social services
provided by the state or nongovernmental organiza-
tions.Moreover, refugees exposed to verbal or physical
assault by government agents or native populations
likely feel less safe in the host country and are more
likely to consider returning home.
Decisions are also affected by the portfolio of
policies across multiple domains that support refugee
2 Emerging literature has begun to challenge this narrative. See, e.g.,
Steele (2019) and Schwartz (2019).
3 data2.unhcr.org/en/news/13033. To provide context for our study,
52%of the Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon inMay 2015 (when
the UNHCR stopped registration) were female and 54% were
children.
























































































































populations or define their rights. In the host country,
this includes laws affecting the ability to work, freedom
of movement, and any rights to pursue naturalization.
In the home country, policies include rules around
forced conscription and whether the incumbent gov-
ernment would grant minority and opposition groups
amnesty upon return. Finally, international policies
might influence the ability of relief organizations to
provide aid, the openness of transit routes, and the
availability of resettlement opportunities.
This pretheoretical framework presents factors influ-
encing refugee decisions about the future. However,
refugees may be swayed by any or all factors, making it
difficult to tease out which will influence individual
refugees. Therefore, we develop a theoretical argu-
ment to prioritize factors.
Refugees and the Anchoring Effects of
Attachment to Place
In developing a theoretical account for variation in
refugee preferences regarding returning to their coun-
tries of origin, we apply the concept of anchoring. We
suggest individuals are inclined to return home if they
feel attachment to their country of origin and disin-
clined if not or if they enjoy attachments to their new
host country.
We assume individual decision making is subject to
bounded rationality via limits on capacity (Simon 1972)
and cognitive heuristics serve to reduce the complexity
of assessments and calculations, enabling individuals to
make difficult decisions more efficiently (Tversky and
Kahneman 1974) but also more strategically (Johnson
2020). Refugee decision making is surely subject to
these efficiencies and strategic adaptations. We suggest
two ways this theoretical approach is valuable for
understanding refugee decision making. First, dis-
placed individuals are challenged by limited informa-
tion, uncertain levels of risk, and constraints on their
ability to act independently in the future. As such,
anchoring effects are critical to refugees’ decision-
making processes,4 informing which factors have the
greatest bearing upon their preferred course of action.
Second, anchor biases affect judgements of self-
efficacy and predictions of future performance. Exist-
ing explanations of refugee decision making speak to
the shaping role of local context, yet they often
erroneously homogenize refugee experiences such as
exposure to violence and decisions to flee. Our anchor-
based logic suggests individuals are exposed to differ-
ent degrees of anchoring depending upon variation in
these kinds of lived experiences. This anchoring bias
refers to a process in which an individual’s initial deci-
sion (e.g., whether to flee) is anchored to a specific
starting point. It is assumed individuals’ decisions will
be biased toward this starting point when making sub-
sequent choices, especially when faced with complexity
and uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). How-
ever, as additional information becomes available, indi-
viduals will adjust their anchor and attachment to their
anchor accordingly (Slovic 1972).
Broader research on decision making demonstrates
individual judgements of self-efficacy have a strong
bearing on adjustments to subsequent decision making
and behavior. Cervone and Peake (1986) demonstrate
this in a generic setting, presenting study participants
with random initial values of high or low levels of
performance and then asking them to judge their own
capabilities for the problem-solving task before them.
High-anchor participants regarded themselves with
higher levels of self-efficacy than did low-anchor parti-
cipants. These judgments corresponded to subsequent
task performance, with participants who judged them-
selves at higher levels of self-efficacy demonstrating
greater task persistence. Switzer and Sniezek (1991)
subsequently examined the anchoring effect on predic-
tions of future performance. While they were unable to
draw any conclusive findings on the effect of the
anchors on actual performance, they did find a notable
relationship between anchors and individual self-
judgment on likely future effort and performance.
What does this tell us about refugee decision making
specifically? We argue an important first effect of
anchoring is an individual’s exposure to violence.5
Individuals are forced to flee from their homes as
conflict closes in upon them, when they are stripped
of civil liberties and rights, and when they are targeted
by repressive government actions (Davenport, Moore,
and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2007; Neumayer
2004; Schmeidl 1997). An individual’s decision to flee is
informed by their perception of risk. Individuals from
areas of conflict or disaster alter their risk preferences
based on prior exposure to similar events (Eckel,
El-Gamal, and Wilson 2009; Voors et al. 2012). For
example, victims of violence display strong preferences
TABLE 1. Framework for Refugee Decision Making about Future Movements




Root causes of flight
Decision-making context
Social ties






4 Our logic also fills a gap in the literature on anchoring when it comes
to understanding how individual differences and past experiencemay
compound or mitigate the anchoring effect (Furnham and Boo 2011).
5 Exposure to violence encompasses direct experiences with vio-
lence, as well as witnessing violence.
























































































































for high degrees of certainty regarding future decisions
(Callen et al. 2014), and victims of natural disasters
subsequently display higher risk aversion in anticipa-
tion of future events (Cameron and Shah 2015). Expos-
ure to violence can also result in heightened anxiety,
depression, perceived insecurity, vulnerability, and
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). A prominent
feature of PTSD is an avoidance of stimuli associated
with a traumatic event (Fleurkens, Rinck, and Van
Minnen 2014).
These logics suggest refugees exposed to violence
prior to fleeing their country of origin are less likely to
desire to return while conflict is ongoing. Prior expos-
ure to violence provides useful heuristics for refugees
who prefer avoiding reexposure and likely prefer to
return when conflict ends, if at all. Thus, refugees who
have been exposed to violence likely feel anchored to
their new host state and wish to avoid future risk of
trauma. This suggests a conventional understanding of
the effects of violence on decision making:
H1: Refugees exposed to violence before they were
displaced are less likely to want to return to their country
of origin.
Anchoring is also central to our understanding
of individual attachments to meaningful locations.
Place attachment can augment the anchoring heuristic
by serving as a reference point for future decision
making.6 Such attachments enhance self-esteem and
self-efficacy and can provide a bridge for one’s identity
between prior experiences and future actions (Scannell
andGifford 2010). So, when do people attach or detach
from a particular place? Simply stated, place attach-
ments are formed from judgements of satisfaction,
expectations of stability, and feelings of positive affect
(Shumaker and Taylor 1983). When an individual’s
aggregate assessment of a location is positive, they
are attached and unlikely to detach. When their assess-
ment is negative, theymay become detached. Crucial to
understanding (in)voluntary relocation, is the idea that
an individual’s place attachment is neither monolithic
nor permanent. Some individuals may have attach-
ments to multiple places simultaneously (Gustafson
2009), and the intensity of attachments between loca-
tions likely varies depending on updated cost-benefit
analyses (Giuliani 2003).
In migrant decision making, place attachments may
constrain the decision to leave home, prompt a decision
to leave when losses are intolerable, influence choice of
potential destinations, and affect migrants’ postmigra-
tion experiences (Dandy et al. 2019). Individuals with
stronger place attachments are less willing to leave
those places. For example, residents exposed to high
flood risk have been shown to be less willing to evacu-
ate or relocate if they demonstrated high place attach-
ment (De Dominicis et al. 2015). This is shown with
Javanese communities remaining in or returning to
high risk disaster areas (Lavigne et al. 2008), Norwe-
gian residents’ unwillingness to relocate in the case of
an oil spill (Kaltenborn 1998), and Australian residents
having weaker intentions to leave in the face of a
brushfire outbreak (Paton, Burgelt, and Prior 2008).
Place attachment might also motivate decisions to
return following displacement, even in the face of
danger. For instance, rural residents displaced by the
Bhakra Nangal Dam Project in the Himalayas con-
tinued to search for ways to return to their habitats
despite knowing these habitats were at high risk of
future flooding (Pirta, Chandel, and Pirta 2014).
Various case studies suggest that exposure to adver-
sity heightens individuals’ perception of future risks in
conflict settings (Callen et al. 2014; Voors et al. 2012).
Exposure can also prompt them to develop adaptive
skills to identify threats, find ways to manage them
(Brück, d’Errico, and Pietrelli 2018; Hernández-
Carretero and Carling 2012), and increase their per-
ceived competence to tackle similar situations in the
future. Several studies even find individuals become
more risk acceptant (Voors et al. 2012) or less risk
averse (Bocquého et al. 2018) after being exposed to
violence. In the context of refugee decisionmaking, this
suggests that refugees exposed to violence prior to their
displacement may be more likely to want to return to
the locus of violence than are individuals without such
prior exposure.
To explain, we assume individuals manage risk and
uncertainty associated with new and potential future
experiences by relying, in part, on prior experience
(Zinn 2008). The underlying logic behind these strat-
egies of riskmanagement “is not one of cause and effect
but one of analogy, a situation or event is like a
previously experienced situation and therefore the
decisions, action, and feelings from the previous situ-
ation are pertinent to the current situation” (Zinn 2008,
446). When exposed to violence, individuals develop
several skills that enable them to identify threats and
minimize risks. For example, Kirschenbaum’s (2006,
22) study of terrorism and risk perceptions finds that
“one important reason for themarginal impact of terror
in Israel has been that individuals, families and larger
social groups have adapted their preparedness behav-
iors so as to minimize its impact.” Similarly, when
deciding to return to conflict, individuals can draw on
their past experiences to assess and manage risks en
route or at home.
Anchoring to place can help explain why this might
be the case. Individuals attached to their homes may
wait until the last minute to make the decision to
migrate elsewhere. During that period of waiting, they
develop tools to assess the risks they face. For example,
individuals exposed to military shelling learn to gauge
the distance of shells from the various sounds they
make. Recognizing these sounds can help them evalu-
ate when to take cover. If this simple strategy matches
reality, individuals will be able to make quick, adaptive
decisions to protect themselves against potential harm.
This explanation does not homogenize exposure to
violence. Rather, each form of violence may be
6 We define place attachment as the process through which people
give “culturally shared emotional/ affective meanings to a particular
space or piece of land that provides the basis for the individual’s …
understanding of and relation to the environment” (Low 1992, 165).
























































































































associated with the development of unique adaptive
strategies that protect them during similar future
events. Furthermore, individuals need not be the direct
victims of violence to develop expertise; they may also
learn through “vicarious reinforcement”—by witness-
ing the actions of others and their consequences
(Bandura 1971).
By adapting to and overcoming obstacles, individuals
will enjoy higher self-efficacy and perception of control
over adverse events (Bandura 1977). Self-efficacious
individuals will tend to tackle threats head-on.7 In the
context of refugee situations, the ability to identify
threats enables individuals to bet on a return to their
country of origin even while the threat of violence
persists.
The more familiar an event is and the more know-
ledgeable the individual experiencing it, the less likely
they are to fear similar events in the future. A series of
studies of responses to terrorist violence and natural
disasters illustrate why this might be the case. Societies
experiencing rare large-scale terrorist events are more
likely to have higher stress and anxiety levels due to the
uncertainty shock of the event (Galea et al. 2002; Rubin
et al. 2005). However, those experiencing “chronic”
terrorism are considerably less likely to exhibit fear
and uncertainty regarding future violent events
(Spilerman and Stecklov 2009). This may be why risk
assessment differs between experts and the public on a
wide variety of issues (Slovic 1987). For example,
“repeated bombing- related media exposure [after the
Boston Marathon bombings] was associated with
higher acute stress than was direct exposure”
(Holman, Garfin, and Silver 2014). Other research
shows residents who refused to evacuate, despite
impending warnings of a natural disaster, were those
who had successfully overcome similar previous disas-
ters (Strang 2014). Furthermore, individuals who were
surveyed about hypothetical disasters exhibited exag-
gerated concerns if they had not previously lived
through an event of the same type (Reinhardt 2017).
Taken together, these logics imply individuals with
stronger attachment to their homelands may have been
more likely to be exposed to violence prior to fleeing
and, thus, may also prefer to return when possible.
Additionally, their prior exposure and “expert” status
helps to ensure they can better assess and tolerate risk
associated with the potential for future exposure. By
contrast, refugees who fled their homes prior to direct
exposure to violence may have done so because of less
attachment to that location and are likely to feel greater
uncertainty regarding future potential exposures and,
thus, be unwilling to accept the risk. Their skepticism
and anxiety about the situation make them less willing
to return to their country of origin. Accordingly, this
leads to the following pair of hypotheses that contradict
hypothesis 1:
H2a: Refugees exposed to violence before displacement
are more likely to want to return to their country of
origin.
H2b:Refugees with a stronger attachment to their home-
lands are more likely to want to return to their country of
origin.
Finally, social anchor theory posits individuals’
social networks in informal and formal social settings
serve to anchor them within a community (Clopton
and Finch 2011). Social anchors foster a sense of
collective identity by contextualizing and rooting per-
sonal relationships. Linking identity, security, and
integration in migration processes, Grzymala-
Kazlowska (2016, 1131) identifies social anchoring as
“the process of finding significant reference: grounded
points which allow migrants to restore their socio-
psychological stability in new life settings. The anchors
people use allow them to locate their place in their
world, give form to their own sense of being and
provide them with a base for psychological and social
functioning.”
Social anchors take on various forms, including
“legal and institutional (e.g., personal documents, legal
status, access to formal institutions), economic (eco-
nomic resources, consumed goods, types of economic
activity), spatial and environmental (such as place of
birth, place of residence)… social and professional
(e.g., family roles, occupation, being an immigrant), a
position in social structure and group belonging (real or
imagined)” (Grzymala-Kazlowska 2016, 1131).
Anchoring can, thus, be understood as what allows
individuals to connect or disconnect from various social
and spatial places.
With respect to refugee situations, just as they have
previously detached from their home locations, refu-
gees can become anchored to host communities to
varying degrees. They may, for example, have familial
networks, economic stability through a job, or access to
education for their children. Refugees with these social
anchors are likely to feel more rooted and secure in the
host nation and may perceive returning to their coun-
tries of origin to be too risky. Accordingly, this leads to
the following hypothesis:
H3: Refugees socially anchored to the host state are less
likely to want to return to their country of origin.
RESEARCH DESIGN
To test our hypotheses, we draw upon an original
survey of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. We do so by
pursuing two complementary modeling strategies,
using observational and experimental elements of our
survey. Our observational survey analysis examines
our full set of theoretical expectations.We complement
these analyses with a conjoint experiment. As our
theory suggests, place attachment and prior exposure
7 Traumatic events have also been shown to increase individuals’
perceived competence through posttraumatic growth (PTG). Post-
traumatic growth theory holds that personal growth and develop-
ment can result from “major life crises” (Tedeschi and Calhoun
2004). Individuals who display PTG experience personal improve-
ment in several dimensions—one of the most relevant being a
strengthened self-perception (Tedeschi and Calhoun 1996).
























































































































to violence are likely to vary together: individuals most
attached to their hometown are those most likely to
have been pushed out as violence was closing in on
them. The goal of the conjoint experiment is to disen-
tangle these two mechanisms in order to examine
whether individuals’ prior exposure to violence is likely
to affect their risk calculations upon return.
It is important to highlight some key traits of this
research design. First, Syrian refugees are the largest
single-country share of the global refugee population,
and Lebanon hosts the largest per capita population of
refugees globally. Accordingly, investigation of this
population of Syrian refugees in Lebanon provides a
great opportunity to focus upon combinations of pre-
flight characteristics and flight-related factors that
appear to influence decision making.8 Second, our data
collection benefits refugee communities by providing a
platform for their preferences in ongoing debates on
repatriation. Third, our survey team’s priority was
doing no harm (Fujii 2012; The Belmont Report 1978;
Wood 2006).9
Survey Sample
We surveyed nearly 2,000 Syrian refugees throughout
Lebanon during June and July 2018.10 According to
the official statistics of the UNHCR, over 1,000,000
Syrians are living in Lebanon. They are distributed
throughout the country, with 70% living in residential
buildings and 30% in unofficial settlements and
camps. Our goal was to try to ensure the distribution
of survey responses reflected the geographic distribu-
tion of the refugee population. To do so, we first
grouped the eight governorates in Lebanon into four
contiguous governorate pairs (regions) and used the
known distribution of refugees in these regions to
determine a proportionally representative survey dis-
tribution per region.11
Second, we further distributed the governorate-pair
survey quota across the 24 districts of the country, such
that the number of responses per district would be
proportional to the size of the refugee population in
each district, as determined by the UNHCR at the
time of fielding.12 We then selected towns or settle-
ments within each district such that their probability of
being selected was proportional to the size of the
refugee population in each town or settlement.
Because all refugees must register with municipalities,
we were able to obtain a household listing of Syrian
refugees for each town. Typically, Syrian refugee
households were clustered within a town. Within each
town, we used systematic sampling to select house-
holds from this listing: the starting household in each
town or settlement was randomly selected from the list
until an adult respondent who was willing to partici-
pate was found (only one individual per household
was selected). The enumerator team then skipped
three houses to go to the fifth house on the list to
request their next participant. This process continued
until options in a specific town were exhausted or the
required number of surveys were completed. The
same method was applied in unofficial settlements:
after the first tent was chosen enumerators skipped the
next three to choose the fifth.
OBSERVATIONAL ANALYSES
We focus first on our observational analyses. For our
dependent variable, we rely upon a question assessing
respondents’ feelings about the possibility of returning
to Syria. The question asked, “How much do you
disagree/agree with the following statement: I would
NOT return to Syria under any circumstances.”
Respondents answered on a seven-point scale ranging
from strongly agree (meaning they would NEVER
return to Syria) to strongly disagree (meaning they
WOULD return to Syria). From the responses, we
generate our primary dependent variable, never return
ordinal. Given the structure of these data, we run
analyses using a series of ordered logistic regressions.
We group our primary independent variables based
upon our three hypotheses. Experienced violence is a
dichotomous indicator coded 1 if the refugee personally
experienced violence in Syria before departing their
hometown and 0 otherwise. Each respondent was
asked whether they experienced the following: physical
assault/beaten, physical and mental torture, abduction,
sexual violence, forced labor, wage theft, shot at, or
shelling. If the respondent answered that they experi-
enced at least one of these types of violence, the
variable is coded as 1. We use this variable to test the
competing hypotheses 1 and 2a.
We then code four variables to test hypothesis 2b,
which refers to hometown attachment. The first, pro-
portion of hometown that fled, is a categorical variable
differentiating individuals who fled when almost
none/a small proportion (baseline), half, or most/all
of their hometown had already fled. The second, dis-
cussed fleeing, is a binary variable, coded 1 if, prior to
their displacement, the individual talked about fleeing
with their household, neighbors, family, community
leaders, local authorities, or on online forums and
0 otherwise. These two variables are closely associated.
Both capture whether migration intentions were being
formed prior to flight or whether the individual was,
instead, pushed out by violence. We expect that, if an
individual is attached to their homeland, they are less
8 We also asked respondents questions about conditions on the
ground in Lebanon; however, these responses vary minimally across
our sample. See Mourad (2019) for a deeper understanding of the
variation in local migration policies in Lebanon and its impact on the
lived experiences of Syrian refugees.
9 See Appendix B for a comprehensive discussion and evaluation of
the ethical challenges faced in this study and the decisions we took to
manage them.
10 The effective number of observations after cleaning the survey was
1,750; 250 observations were removed due to errors with the survey
software.
11 See Appendix A for a full discussion of the sampling population
and survey administration underlying our study, as well as Table 1,
which displays the relative distribution of refugees across Lebanon’s
regions and the associated sample per region.
12 See Table 2 in Appendix A.
























































































































likely to flee unless they are being pushed out by
violence. As such, hypothesis 2b would be confirmed
by a positive relationship between the proportion of
hometown that fled and willingness to return to Syria
and a negative relationship between discussed fleeing
and willingness to return to Syria.13
We also include two additional variables to capture
an attachment to the homeland, all dichotomous. The
first indicates whether the individuals resides in a Syr-
ian neighborhood in Lebanon. Networks of individuals
with a shared community origin provide certain posi-
tive externalities that are specific to the location where
contacts reside, which include reducing the “psychic
costs” of leaving a familiar environment (Barrett and
Mosca 2013; Faini and Venturini 2010; Massey et al.
1993; Sjaastad 1962). Living in a location surrounded by
individuals with shared community origin helps indi-
viduals maintain the familiar connection to their home-
land through the maintenance of shared customs and
traditions. The second indicates whether the refugee
was employed before the outbreak of the war, which
would have constituted an important anchor to the
homeland.
Finally, to test hypothesis 3, we create eight binary
variables capturing social attachment to Lebanon.
Recall that our theory considers social anchors to be
any institution—be it social, economic, physical, polit-
ical, legal—which may be a source of sociopsychologi-
cal stability for refugees (Clopton and Finch 2011;
Grzymala-Kazlowska 2016). Whether an individual
has close family in Lebanon who are employed at the
time of the survey, whether they think the situation in
Lebanon has gotten worse since their arrival, whether
they live in a camp, whether they are comfortable
reporting crimes, and whether they are registered with
the United Nations are all indicators of anchoring and
stability.14 We also include whether they believe it is
easy to cross the Lebanese/Syrian border. Ease of
border crossing facilitates attachment to the host coun-
try because it allows individuals to make short trips
back to Syria, while keeping their family in Lebanon.
Finally, we include whether their household is larger
than five individuals. Asmigration is often considered a
household decision, that the family has managed to
reunite may signal the end of a sequential migration
process (Haug 2008).
Our control variables include the length of time, in
years, the individual has been displaced from Syria as
well as variables measuring individuals’ demographic
characteristics and their prewar situations. This
includes their gender, age, whether they have children,
and their prewar income and education. We also
include Syrian district fixed effects to account for unob-
served heterogeneity based on their hometown loca-
tions in their country of origin.15
At first glance, the controls lack some intuitively
important factors. While the literature on refugee
repatriation highlights a lack of economic opportunities
in the host state and social networks at home as drivers
for return, our survey sample shows no variation in
responses on these questions. Almost all respondents
say Lebanon has few economic opportunities for refu-
gees. Similarly, almost all refugees still have family and
connections remaining in Syria. Additionally, all
respondents reported being Sunni Muslim. Thus, we
have no variation in identity to leverage. However, this
is representative of the Syrian refugee population in
Lebanon and not a limitation of our study. While these
factors may affect individuals’ likelihoods of returning,
we are unable to test this given the homogeneity in
responses. If anything, this allows us to capture dynam-
ics of the individual’s context of flight more clearly.
Results
To capture a preliminary understanding of our vari-
ables of interest, we provide descriptive cross-tabula-
tions in Table 3 in Appendix D. These show that, on
average, most refugees disagree with the statement that
they would never return to Syria, which provides initial
support for a place attachment to the homeland, as
proposed in hypothesis 2. At the same time, some
variables capturing an attachment to Lebanon or
detachment from Syria show respondents wanting to
stay in their host state. For instance, refugees who
believe the situation in Lebanon is about the same as
before and those who discussed fleeing are more likely
to agree with the statement that they would not return
to their country of origin.16
Next, Table 2 presents the results of our ordered
logistic regression assessing whether respondents
agreed with the statement that they would never return
to Syria. Column (1) displays the results of experien-
cing violence. Column (2) adds circumstances related
to connections to the homeland. Column (3) presents
13 Whenmeasuring exposure to violence, Blattman (2009) and Schon
(2019) differentiate between violence witnessed, violence received,
and violence to family. Our experienced violence indicator is only
able to capture “violence received.”However, our logic of experien-
tial learning and geographical anchoring would suggest that a violent
experience—be it witnessed or received—is associated with learning
new adaptive strategies to protect oneself against future harm.
Because individuals are more likely to have witnessed violence if
their departure was delayed (e.g., Schon 2019), proportion of home-
town that fled allows us to tap into this concept by proxy. In
Appendix E, we also examine “family experience” using our obser-
vational data and find it has near identical effects to “direct
experience.” Our results are robust to the inclusion of this variable.
14 UNHCR registration gives refugees security. It is easier for Syrians
with a registration certificate from the UNHCR to obtain legal
residency and enjoy protection against deportation (Fakhoury
2020, 5). The Lebanese government voted in 2014 to halt the
UNHCR from registering any more Syrian refugees. This took effect
January 2015, which means those arriving after this time could no
longer receive benefits and aid from the UNHCR.
15 See Appendix H for additional specifications of geographic het-
erogeneity. Results are robust to all specifications.
16 We found a lack of variation with whom respondents discussed
fleeing. All respondents either did not discuss fleeing with anyone or
only discussed fleeing with their household. However, the fact that
they were willing to do so indicates that the respondents felt that they
were secure enough to speak openly within their household
(Pearlman 2016; Schon 2019).
























































































































results examining social attachment to the host country.
Our final ordered logistic regression in Column
(4) includes all variables in one model.
Our theory suggests refugee decision making is influ-
enced by anchoring effects whereby prior exposure to
violence affects future decision making. Our primary
independent variable of interest, experienced violence,
is positive and significant in all model specifications.
Our results reflect that refugees who experienced
violence are more likely to disagree with the statement
that they would never return to Syria under any cir-
cumstances, which supports hypothesis 2a.17 Individ-
uals are more willing to return to Syria at some point
TABLE 2. Decision to Flee on Desire to Return to Syria at Some Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Experienced violence 1.205*** 0.735*** 0.692***
(0.109) (0.123) (0.131)
Half hometown fled 1.309*** 1.243***
(0.200) (0.236)
Most hometown fled 1.272*** 1.194***
(0.192) (0.227)
Discussed fleeing −0.481** −0.488**
(0.168) (0.174)
Syrian neighborhood in LBN 0.621*** 0.710***
(0.126) (0.143)
Easy border crossing −0.545*** −0.443**
(0.142) (0.151)
Employed before war −0.079 −0.047
(0.129) (0.135)




Situation in LBN is worse 0.847*** 0.319*
(0.136) (0.150)
Registered with UN 0.480*** 0.251*
(0.119) (0.127)
Living in camp 0.037 −0.205
(0.123) (0.145)
Comfortable reporting crimes 0.159 −0.260†
(0.116) (0.140)
Household larger than 5 0.269* 0.083
(0.109) (0.115)
Displaced duration 0.026 0.022 −0.009 0.019
(0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
Intermediate school dropout −0.154 −0.040 −0.186 −0.029
(0.115) (0.120) (0.117) (0.122)
Secondary school dropout 0.222 0.243 0.131 0.276
(0.156) (0.165) (0.161) (0.170)
Secondary school and above 0.251 0.429† 0.178 0.451†
(0.249) (0.256) (0.251) (0.260)
Prewar income: $201–$500 1.217*** 0.150 0.958*** 0.195
(0.121) (0.156) (0.123) (0.163)
Prewar income: Greater than $500 0.919*** −0.084 0.600*** −0.026
(0.148) (0.191) (0.155) (0.199)
Age −0.001 0.003 −0.003 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Married 0.248 0.246 0.296 0.285
(0.183) (0.188) (0.188) (0.195)
Male −0.867*** −0.359** −0.944*** −0.456***
(0.107) (0.124) (0.113) (0.130)
Children −0.359* −0.300 −0.335† −0.379†
(0.182) (0.188) (0.188) (0.197)
N 1,518 1,486 1,484 1,453
Note: Syrian hometown fixed effects omitted. †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
17 Results are robust to whether the respondent or one of their family
members experienced violence. Gender identification returns robust
findings.
























































































































even if they experienced violence before being dis-
placed from their hometowns. This is consistent with
the idea that they might have developed adaptive
strategies to identify threats and find ways to manage
them and, thus, be more willing to risk exposure to
violence upon return than individuals who have not
previously been exposed to violence. Further on this
point, we refer the reader to a discussion of existing
evidence and descriptive statistics on gender and vio-
lence in Appendix F. Additional regressions and con-
joint analyses show that gender does not appear to
significantly condition the relationship between experi-
ence with violence and willingness to return, nor does it
appear to condition risk calculations. The finding that
experienceswith violence affect bothmen andwomen’s
willingness to return is striking because acts encoun-
tered across genders are very distinct (see Table F.2 in
Appendix F). This finding may suggest further support
for our hypothesis that refugees exposed to violence in
Syria are more likely to have developed adaptive strat-
egies to identify and manage the threats they are likely
to encounter upon return—and these threats are likely
to be very different depending on whether the refugee
identifies as a man or a woman. We also find that men
are, in general, less willing to return. This may be due to
the prospect of forced conscription (European Institute
of Peace 2019).
Our anchoring logic suggests a secondary mechan-
ism, which is intrinsically tied to lived experiences:
place attachment. Individuals with greater attachment
to their hometown are expected to be most likely to
wait until the last minute to flee. This appears to be
empirically validated by the observation that the higher
the proportion of individuals who had already fled the
respondent’s hometown the more likely that individual
would return to Syria at some stage.
Similarly, if the individual currently resides in a
Syrian neighborhood in Lebanon, they also appear
to prefer to return to Syria at some stage. However,
if individuals discussed fleeing with others before
doing so, they are less willing to return to Syria under
any circumstance. This suggests that those who had
a conversation about the decision to flee did so
because they found it easier to detach from their home
location in the first instance. These individuals are
contrasted with refugees who may not have had the
time to discuss migration plans and became displaced
against their intention. Employment before the out-
break of the civil war does not seem to influence
return intentions.
As per our theoretical framework, evidence for
hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b jointly support the
presence of anchoring to the country of origin. How-
ever, we are more confident in our ability to observe
our place-attachment mechanisms. Examining when an
individual fled in relation to others in their hometown
who were at similar risk of encountering violence is a
relatively clear measure of place attachment. However,
we can only assess individuals’ perceived self-efficacy
and ability to assess risks indirectly by observing the
relationship between lived experiences and return
intentions. Our second set of analyses will complement
these results by allowing us to examine this mechanism
more directly.18
Next, we identify variables signifying an attachment to
the host state. Refugees who believe that the situation in
Lebanon isworse thanwhen they arrived aremore likely
to prefer return. Also, those who believe it is easy to
cross the Lebanese/Syrian border are less likely to desire
return, yet this could be explainedby the fact it is easy for
them to go back and forth informally, meaning there is
no need to return formally to war-torn Syria. However,
those with close family in Lebanon, a job, and registra-
tion with the UN are all more likely to prefer returning
to Syria. In other words, we find limited support for
hypothesis three on social anchors in the partial Model
3. Nonetheless, these effects appear more muted in the
comprehensive Model 4. It is possible that, while close
family, jobs, and legal documentation serve as a social
anchors in normal circumstances, Syrian refugees are
more likely to have precarious jobs and face a great deal
of legal obstacles, even if they are registered with the
UNHCR (Nassar and Stel 2019), andmaywish to return
to Syria with their close family.
Figure 1 displays the average marginal effect of
factors leading up to displacement, using results from
comprehensive Model 4. The first panel demonstrates
that 71.7% of refugees who experienced violence dis-
agree with the statement that they would never return
to Syria. This goes against common assumptions that
refugees who experienced violence would never desire
to return to their country of origin (hypothesis 1) and
offers compelling evidence in support of hypothesis 2a.
The rest of the panels presented in Figure 1 also reflect
some rather stark trends; 36.6% of individuals who dis-
cussed fleeing (prior to doing so) agree that they would
never return to Syria under any circumstances, compared
with 27.4% that did not have such discussions. Addition-
ally, 37.6% of refugees who were among the first to flee
their hometown disagree that they would never return to
Syria, compared with 66.4% and 68.2% of those where
half or most of their hometown had fled, respectively.
Each of these findings offer support for hypothesis 2b.
Figure 2 displays the average marginal effects of
respondent’s perceptions of conditions in the host state.
These findings illustrate some evidence for hypothesis
3. The left panel shows that refugees who feel it is easy
to cross the Lebanese/Syrian border are more likely to
prefer never returning. However, respondents who
believe the situation in Lebanon continues to worsen
are more likely to prefer returning than those who
believe the situation in Lebanon is about the same as
before. The middle panel shows that 68.8% of refugees
18 It is possible that refugees’ experiences with violence may have led
to thembecoming politicized and, therefore, wish to return to Syria as
political agents despite the risks involved. This possibility is suggested
by Petersen (2011) and Malkki (1995). For ethical reasons, we
decided not to ask about political allegiances (See Appendix B).
However, we believe the threat of conscription by both the govern-
ment and opposition as well as the government surveillance of
returnees as part of the return and reconciliation process
(European Institute of Peace 2019) would make political agency very
difficult and, therefore, unlikely to motivate return aspirations.
























































































































who live in predominantly Syrian neighborhoods in
Lebanon want to return at some point, signaling an
attachment to home rather than host.
CONJOINT ANALYSES
In the above analyses, we find individuals that experi-
enced harm before fleeing are more likely to consider
returning when conflict is ongoing. In this section, we
probe this further. In hypothesis 2a, we posited refugees
directly exposed to violence in Syria are more likely to
have developed adaptive strategies to identify threats
and manage them. This means they are more likely to
risk exposure to violence upon return than individuals
not previously exposed to violence. However, individuals
exposed to violence are also likely to be those with
greater place attachment,whowaiteduntil the lastminute
to flee. As we posit in hypothesis 2b, place attachment is
likely to drive return decisions in its own right.
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Because place attachment and prior exposure to
violence are likely correlated, it is difficult to disentan-
gle these explanations using standard survey items. We
use a conjoint experiment to isolate the effects of prior
exposure to harm on risk assessment upon return to
Syria (hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2a). That is, we seek
to examine risk assessment independently from con-
founding variables such as hometown attachment.
In the conjoint setup, respondents are given two
hypothetical destinations in Syria to which to consider
returning. These destinations vary in terms of key
attributes, including probability of violence en route.
Because the attributes of the choice are varied ran-
domly across return options and across a series of
choice tasks, we are able to examine the effects of a
respondent’s prior exposure to harm on return risk
calculations independent of hometown attachment or
other confounding variables. Our theoretical frame-
work suggests that individuals’ heterogeneous lived
experiences will affect assessments on return to their
hometown—a setting where they encountered these
experiences. In the conjoint analyses, we expect indi-
viduals to factor their actual prior experiences into their
conception of what harm could look like en route to a
hypothetical destination.
A random sample of 406 respondents from our survey
sample were each presented with five return tasks con-
sisting of a choice between two location profiles, each
consisting of four attributes. Of interest here is the
attribute “chance of harm en route to that location.”
However, we also included the chance of a peaceful
situation lasting at least a year there, the number of
people the hypothetical migrant would know there, and
the ease of finding work. These tasks prompted individ-
uals to consider a hypothetical migrant like themselves:
“I would like you to imagine a person, like yourself, but
this person is considering a return to Syria. I would like
you to consider the following two places in Syria, where
there is currently no fighting taking place, and I would
like you to tell me which place in Syria you think this
person should go to.” Respondents were then asked to
state their preferred choice from two hypothetical alter-
natives in Syria generically labeled “PlaceA” and “Place
B.” Respondents were asked to choose between one of
these two location alternatives or skip the task if they did
not know or did not want to answer. On average, each
respondent completed 4.9 tasks. The values for each
attribute were independently and randomly varied as
per the levels shown in Table 3. An example of a choice
task is shown in Table 4.
In our analysis, we follow the statistical approach for
conjoint analysis developed in Hainmueller, Hopkins,
and Yamamoto (2014). Specifically, we estimate the
average causal effect of an attribute level relative to a
baseline level, or the averagemarginal component effect
(AMCE). TheAMCEs are akin to treatment effects in a
standard survey experiment, where the treatment is
compared with a particular control condition (Bansak
et al. 2021, 15; Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020). This is
possible due to the randomization of the attribute levels
whereby the effect of a level on the probability of choice
is estimated by taking the probability that alternatives
with that level, across all sampled levels of all the other
attributes, are chosen compared with alternatives with a
different level of that attribute.
In our conjoint, the assignment of levels to profiles is
fully random such that each respondent has an equal
chance of viewing any given attribute–level combination
(out of all possible combinations) within a profile. As
such, the sets of profiles involving each level should be
balanced (Hainmueller,Hopkins, andYamamoto 2014).
This can be investigated by looking at the omnibus tests
of the fits of regression models of any of the respondent
characteristics against the attribute levels. As shown in
Appendix G, we find no evidence of imbalance (all p >
0.05) with respect to any of our variables.
Figure 3 shows the causal effect of the change in the
attribute level from the reference level of the conjoint
experiment. The left panel displays all observations, the
middle panel shows estimates from those who did not
experience violence, and the right panel displays effects
of respondents who experienced violence prior to their
displacement. The unconditional results show that refu-
gees prefer to return to locations in Syria where there is
a smaller chance of experiencing harm on the journey
there. This effect is similar when examining refugees
who did not experience violence firsthand before flee-
ing. On the other hand, of refugees who experienced
violence, there is no statistically significant difference
betweenmoderate and low levels of harm en route.This
supports our argument that refugees who lived through
violence likely perceive that they are well placed to
manage the potential for harm on a future journey. The
only other attribute with a statistically significant effect
was ease of finding work: refugees who believed it
would be hard for them to find employment were less
TABLE 4. Example of Choices from the
Conjoint Experiment
Place A Place B
Chance of harm on route to
destination
Low Low
Chance of peaceful situation
lasting at least a year
High Low
Number of people they know
living there
Some Many
Ease of finding work Difficult Difficult
TABLE 3. Attributes and Possible Levels for
the Conjoint Experiment
Attribute Levels




Chance of peaceful situation lasting
at least a year
Low, moderate,
high




Ease of finding work Easy, moderate,
difficult

























































































































































































































































































likely to choose that location. This seems intuitive and
aligns with expectations from the existing literature.
CONCLUSION
There are now 26 million refugees globally: the largest
such number since the end of World War II. Existing
policies dealing with refugee crises neither ease the
disproportionate burden on neighboring countries
serving as hosts nor strengthen temporary protections
until repatriation is deemed feasible. This pushes atten-
tion toward the possibility of voluntary repatriation as a
solution to protracted refugee situations. However,
even though we have witnessed a slight uptick in levels
of repatriation in recent years, this still benefits nomore
than 5% of the total global refugee population and is
often critiqued as being forced rather than voluntary.
Nonetheless, refugees wish to return to their homes. It
is important, therefore, to understand these prefer-
ences before knowing whether to recommend pushing
an agenda for more comprehensive repatriation.
Indeed, states need to protect the right to return safely
and in dignity of refugees whowish to repatriate. This is
necessary to both uphold their human rights and rec-
ognize their agency as they renegotiate their relation-
ship with their nation state, as citizens (Bradley 2013).
This paper addresses this gap by asking what factors
inform refugees’ preferences regarding the potential to
return home. To answer this question, we deployed an
original survey of nearly 2,000 Syrian refugees in Leba-
non. Both observational and experimental analyses
demonstrate those who were exposed to violence prior
to their displacement to Lebanonwish to return to Syria.
We argue these refugees harbor a stronger attachment
to Syria, while also better understanding their tolerance
of violence, because they are “experts” and are more
capable of assessing risk. In contrast, refugees who were
not directly exposed to violence before fleeing are more
unsure of the threats associated with returning and are
unwilling to accept the risk of doing so.
We also find that individuals who endured the diffi-
culties of the Syrian Civil War longer than most of their
hometown’s fellow residents are more likely to desire
to return to Syria. The same is true of those who settled
in predominantly Syrian neighborhoods in Lebanon.
We argue that these effects are also observed effects of
anchoring to their homeland.
At the same time, some refugees develop a sense of
attachment to their host country. While socioeconomic
indicators such as employment or living with family do
not anchor our sample of refugees to their host state,
other conditions, such as the situation in Lebanon and
ease of crossing the border, influence preferences to
return. These findings suggest that refugees can
develop different preferences regarding returning
home and that this may depend upon relative attach-
ment to home and host countries.
Asylum rights globally are being eroded, particularly
since developed states refuse to contribute to providing
safe haven to refugees. As developing states continue to
take on most of the physical responsibility for
accommodating refugees, we offer tentative policy
recommendations. More attention needs to be paid to
the conditions on the ground in these overburdened
neighboring states. Only by enhancing refugee experi-
ences in the host country can we expect to encourage
more refugees to want to remain in the relatively safe
conditions of the host state. Beyond this, it is necessary
to work to better accommodate refugees who hold
strong preferences to return. This presumably means
finding ways of ensuring safe passage for refugees to
complete voluntary repatriation while also working to
protect against coerced repatriation.
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